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ABSTRACT
The objective of the paper is to answer an often-asked question : if tariff rates are reduced, what will
happen to wage inequality ? We consider two types of wage inequality : between occupations (skills
premium), and between industries. We use two large data bases of wage inequality that have become
recently available and a large dataset of average tariff rates all covering the period between  1980
and 2000. We find that tariff reduction is associated with higher inter-occupational and inter-industry
inequality in poorer countries (those below the world median income) and the reverse in richer
countries. The results for inter-occupational inequality though must be treated with caution.
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The relationship between globalization and the distribution of income remains a hotly
debated issue in part because the link is complex and commingled with many other
factors.  In these circumstances, careful specification of the issue is essential.  Theory
offers the natural place to search for precision.  And indeed theory does provide well
specified analyses leading to apparently unambiguous predictions.  The standard
theoretical framework is the two-factor, two-county Heckscher-Ohlin model.  In this
model, trade liberalization will increase the relative price of the abundant factor which is
usually taken to be unskilled labor in the case of developing countries.  This in turn
should reduce inequality.  Thus, a well-specified question leads to an unambiguous
prediction.
The Heckscher-Ohlin specification, however, is a drastic simplification of a complex
phenomenon and relatively minor steps towards greater realism or a shift in focus
towards different aspects of globalization complicate matters.  To take just one example,
Feenstra and Hanson (1996) focus on a different form of globalization: the transfer of
production from developed to developing countries.  In their model, the wage gap
between skilled and unskilled workers in developing countries increases, pointing
towards increased inequality.  Thus, plausible models can lead to quite different
predictions.
Whenever theory leads to different predictions, empirical evidence is required to help
choose among alternatives.  The available empirical literature, however, does not lead
easily to robust conclusions regarding the relationship between globalization and
inequality.  The combination of a complex phenomenon and data inadequacies renders
empirical work both hazardous and partial.  Different authors focus on different aspects
of the phenomenon ranging from within-country wage-inequality to global inequality.
They employ different specifications sometimes relating levels of openness to levels of
inequality and sometimes relating changes in openness to changes in inequality.  And
various alternative definitions of key variables are used including the measure of4
openness with some authors using quantities (trade volumes or flow of FDI) and others
using policies (tariff levels).  The end result is that a careful interpretation of the existing
literature requires attention to all these possible points of differences in the various
studies.
The primary purpose of this paper is to present the results of a new empirical
investigation of the relationship between globalization and inequality, one that we hope
addresses some of the concerns raised above.  In this respect, the paper makes two
contributions.  First, it presents a simple analytical model that focuses on the element of
income distribution that is most likely to be affected by globalization, namely, wage
income.  And second, it draws on a review of the existing empirical literature to identify
preferred ways of specifying the empirical counterpart to our theoretical model.  An
important advantage of this approach is that abundant data are available on the
distribution of wage income in various forms.
A secondary purpose is to incorporate one aspect of globalization that has not
been captured in the academic literature but is prominent in the popular press.  The
media and many governments often interpret globalization as something that happens in
the global economy and affects different countries in different ways. To see this, imagine
a country that does not change its trade policy over a period of years.  And imagine that
over the same period most other countries liberalize their trade policies and the global
volume of trade increases.  The question then is whether the observed “globalization”
can affects inequality in the country that has not changed its trade policies.  The answer
is “yes” if the global expansion of trade reduces the export volumes or prices of the non-
globalizing country.  In this scenario, the non-globalizing country not only fails to
participate in the benefits of an expanding world volume of trade but actually sees a
deterioration in its position compared with the pre-globalization era.  In other words, it
may be insufficient to focus on a country’s own liberalization efforts.  It may be more
appropriate to focus on those efforts relative to the efforts of major trading competitors.
In this view, the direction of causation is from a worldwide phenomenon to inequality.5
The lack of attention to the media view in the academic literature is surprising since it is
in fact an example of a well-known economic concept, namely, pecuniary externalities.
The paper begins in Section 2 with a review of existing empirical work in two critical
dimensions: domain and specification. Domain refers to the type of globalization
(products, capital, or labor) and the type of inequality (global inequality between all
individuals in the world, inequality between the countries, within-country inequality
between individuals, or wage-inequality between wage-earners) under examination.  It
also refers to the locus of the study and whether it is a single-country or a multi-county
study.   Specification is of two types with variables being measured either in levels or in
first differences. This subsection also deals with the important issue of interaction
between policy variables and initial conditions. In Section 3, we present a simple, yet
comprehensive,  model of the equilibrium relationship between wage inequality and trade
policy.  Four categories of wages are examined: for skilled and unskilled labor; and for
labor in protected and unprotected sectors.  The model allows us to explore the ways in
which trade liberalization affects the skill premium, the protection premium, and the
union premium In Section 4 we discuss the variables on wage inequality and trade and
labor liberalization that we use in the empirical part. The empirical model in Section 5 is
estimated in two different ways that draw on two large sets of data on wage inequality.
One is a database of Occupational Wages around the World (OWW) covering the period
from 1983 to 1999 and more than 150 countries. The data were collected from the ILO
sources (the October Inquiry), and then put together and analyzed by Richard Freeman
and Remco Oostendorp (2000).
2  The other is a database of inter-industrial wage
differences created by James Galbraith and associates. This University of Texas
Inequality Project (UTIP) database covers on average about 90 countries annually over
the period 1975-99.
3
                                                
2 The Occupational Wages around the World (OWW) database in available at www.nber.com.
3 The data are available at http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/.6
2. Review of the Empirical Literature
As noted in the Introduction, the literature contains a diverse collection of
empirical efforts to identify the relationship between globalization and inequality.  This
diversity plagues the interpretation of results and comparisons across studies but at the
same time it provides a valuable source of material to guide the empirical specification
of the model presented in Section II.  We thus review the existing literature with the
specific objective of determining the lessons for the estimation of out theoretical model.
Our review covers 15 papers completed within the last ten years. Of these, six
point to a positive relationship between the chosen measure of globalization and the
chosen measure of inequality.  That is, globalization increases inequality.  Three indicate
that globalization increases inequality in low-income countries.  Five studies find no
impact on inequality.  Only one paper points to declining inequality among the
“globalizing countries” including the OECD.  In addition, two other papers (Freeman,
1995, and Richardson, 1995) provide reviews of the then existing empirical literature
and conclude that trade liberalization has a positive (increasing) albeit modest impact on
inequality. What is surprising about this quick summary is that none of the studies
indicate declining inequality in low-income countries, the one region where standard
theory predicts such an outcome.  The choice, then, seems to be between no impact and
increased inequality.
Two qualifications are in order, however.  First, the results are often quite fragile:
small changes in specification or definition of variables can undermine statistical
significance.  And second, each of the 15 studies focuses by necessity on only one aspect
of the relationship between globalization and equity.  In principle, then, these apparently
contradictory results could in fact be perfectly consistent.  To explore this further, we
examine the studies in each of three dimensions: domain, or the focus of the
investigation; specification, especially whether estimates are levels on levels, or changes
on changes; and variable selection, including the choice of variable to represent trade
liberalization.  At the end of our discussion of each dimension, we select our preferred
option(s) for our subsequent empirical analysis.7
Domain
 Globalization in the majority of papers is defined as increased openness in trade
policy.  Only two  papers (Milanovic, 2005a, and Behrmann, Birdsall and Szekely, 2003)
look at capital account liberalization.  None define globalization in terms of increased
labor mobility.  And with respect to inequality, both global inequality (inequality
between all citizens in the world) and within-country inequality receive attention in the
context of multi-country studies.  Interestingly, there is also a significant group of studies
that focus on wage-inequality, typically in the context of single-country studies
exclusively in Latin America.
Clark, Dollar and Kraay (2001) is a good example of a paper dealing with global
inequality.  They find that inequality between the population-weighted mean incomes of
the globalizing countries has decreased substantially between 1975 and 1995. This
reflects increases in average incomes in key developing countries (especially China)
relative to the OECD average, so that population-weighted between-country inequality
has fallen.  At the same time, they point to rising within-country inequality for this group
of countries but not enough to offset the (population-weighted) between-country decline.
This appears to be a fairly firm result but does not of course incorporate the countries
that have not globalized.  Here, Clark, Dollar and Kraay  point to decline and divergence.
Since these are some of the poorest countries in the world, this is clearly a matter of
concern.  Nevertheless, they show that inequality worldwide has declined between the
second half of the seventies and the second half of the nineties despite these disparate
experiences.
If, however, one looks at the world as a whole, the conclusions regarding the
global inequality (inequality between all individuals) are not so firm. Milanovic (2005)
finds a sharp increase between 1988 and 1993,  and then a moderate decline during the
next five-year period. Sala-i-Martin (2002) and Bhalla (2002) argue that global
inequality has gone down although their approach which combines household survey and
national accounts (GDP data) is questionable, and the results may be driven by a number8
of strong assumptions that, in the absence of sufficient data, the authors make. 
4 Global
inequality is an area of intense controversy, but it is worth stating, whatever the “correct”
results, neither of these studies explores the issues of causality—that is, the link between
increased globalization and global inequality.
Within-country inequality is the subject of several papers and is the area where
results are also unclear.  An early example of a paper concerned with within-country
inequality is that by Edwards (1997).  He regresses the change in the Gini index between
the 1970s and the 1980s on a dummy indicating whether or not a country had engaged in
trade liberalization as measured by the average black-market premium or the average
collected tariff ratio.  He finds that trade reform did not significantly affect inequality.
Other authors arriving at similar results albeit using different specifications, time
periods, and data include Londono (2002) and  Dollar and Kraay (2001). Barro (2000),
however, finds that openness, as measured by trade volumes, is associated with higher
levels of inequality in a panel of countries.  He concludes: “Basically, the data reveal a
long-term positive association between the levels of openness and inequality”.  Other
authors, again using different methods and variable definitions, concur.  Spilimbergo,
Londono, and Szekely (1999) and Lundberg and Squire (2003) also detect a link
between openness and increased inequality.
Reconciling these results is difficult because they cover different countries and
time periods (and could therefore be reflecting different relationships) and because they
use different specifications and variable definitions.  One possibility that emerges from
other work is that country categorization may be very important.  Several authors
(Ravallion, 2002, Milanovic 2005a, Savvides 1998) find that their preferred measure of
openness increases inequality in low-income countries.  Barro (2000) also finds the
relationship more pronounced in poorer countries.  In Spilimbergo, Londono and
Szekely (1999, p.88) openness affects countries differently depending on their
endowments: in capital-rich countries, openness reduces inequality while in countries
with abundant skilled-labor, openness increases inequality. The authors argue that the
                                                
4 See Milanovic (2003).9
former effect is driven by reduction of capital rents, the latter effect, however, is
consistent with Heckscher-Ohlin.
The mix of countries in aggregate studies may therefore be the crucial factor
leading to different results.  Either way, this is a very significant result for two reasons.
First, it runs counter to the prediction of conventional trade theory and raises obvious
policy concerns.  And second, it suggests that empirical work would benefit from some
attempt to interact policy changes and initial conditions to capture the possibility of
different effects at different levels of development, a point to which we return below.
Wage-inequality is addressed by several authors in the context of Latin America.
For example, Harrison and Hanson (1999) examine the extent to which the increase in
wage-inequality in Mexico was associated with the 1985 trade reform.  They find that
the reform did play a part but that other factors including foreign direct investment,
export orientation, and technological change were also important. Regarding Mexico,
Robertson (2000) argues that trade liberalization and “labor flexibilization” led to an
erosion of rents in protected industries (which in the case of Mexico were less-skilled)
while foreign investments increased demand for highly-skilled labor. The two effects
resulted in widening wage distribution. Beyer, Rojas and Vergara (1999) find a similar
effect of trade reform on wage-inequality in Chile because skill-intensive, resource-
based industries expanded following liberalization.  Arbache, Dickerson and Green
(2003) find that following the extensive trade liberalization in Brazil in the 1990’s,
average wage in the traded sector fell compared to the non-traded sector (even after
adjusting for education, experience etc.), and that the only category that was spared a
decline were the highly educated because the returns to education went up. Arbache,
Dickerson and Green (2003) argue that these results are consistent with the erosion of
rents in the traded sector in the wake of opening up, and complementarity between new
technology brought in by globalization and skilled labor.
A very important paper is the one by Behrman, Birdsall and Szekely (2003) who
look at the impact of various policies (trade,  financial liberalization, privatization, and
tax  reform) jointly or independently on wage differentials in Latin America during the10
last twenty years. Its use of policy indicators (developed by the Inter-American
Development Bank) rather than of outcomes is very similar to the approach we shall
adopt here. Behrman et al.  conclude that more liberal trade regimes did not have an
impact on wage differentials between different education categories. But financial
liberalization and high-technology exports in the context of a liberal trade regime,
however, contributed to the rising inequality. They conclude (p. 30), “it is not increases
in trade but changes in technology that are associated with growing wage gaps.”
These studies suggest three overall conclusions. First, it is extremely important to
investigate each country’s production structure, the pre-reform sectoral structure of
protection, and the reduction in protection by sector in order to understand the impact of
trade reform.  Second, trade reforms are seldom undertaken in isolation. Most often, they
come together, in a “package” with labor reforms. Disentangling the two effects—in
addition to accounting for the effects of technological progress that may be non-
neutral—is extremely difficult. Third, the impact of trade reform on wage inequality is
likely to be modest if firms adapt to liberalization in a variety ways such as reducing
excess profits and raising productivity as well as reallocating labor.  Indeed, a study for
Brazil finds no impact on wage inequality.  Although returns to college education
increased (Green and Dickerson, 2001), the share of college-educated workers in the
total labor force was insufficient to influence overall inequality.
Each of the possible combinations of types of globalization and inequality is an
appropriate subject for research.  Each provides valuable information in its own right.
For our subsequent work, we follow the majority of other researchers in this field and
focus on liberalization of trade rather than other aspects of globalization such as
investment flows and labor migration, data for the latter being especially difficult to
obtain.  Globalization in products is also worthy of study because it affects far more
countries than globalization in capital flows or labor flows.  And as far as inequality is
concerned, we select within-country, wage inequality for the theoretical and empirical
reasons given in Section II and because this has been a focus of lots of literature
reviewed here.11
Specification
Turning to the econometric specification of the relationship to be estimated, we
take two points from our review: first, although most researchers have regressed levels
on levels, we believe that the work undertaken to date points to the importance of
focusing on changes in both the dependent and explanatory variables; and second,
several studies as well as our theoretical model suggest the impact of policy change
depends on the level of development and that therefore interactive relationships need to
be incorporated.
The specification in most studies is a relationship between levels of inequality and
levels of globalization.  These studies generally have more success in finding statistically
significant results.   Thus, the studies that find a negative impact of globalization on
inequality rely on regressions run in levels.  For example, Barro (2000) regresses the
Gini index on the share of trade in GDN.  Lundberg and Squire (2003) regress the Gini
index on the Sachs-Warner measure of openness.  On the other hand, the studies that
regress changes in inequality on changes in globalization have a much more difficult
time finding significant results.  For example, Edwards (1997) uses the change in
inequality between the 1970s and the 1980s as his dependent variable and a dummy
indicating whether a country undertook trade reform as his explanatory variable.  Dollar
and Kraay (2001) use the growth in the income of the bottom 20 percent and changes in
trade volume.  Both sets of authors conclude that trade reform and/or changes in
openness have no impact on inequality.
Interestingly, two papers undertake both levels-on-levels and changes-on-changes
analyses.  Milanovic (2002) finds that openness hurts poorer deciles in low-income
countries when the analysis relates levels to levels, but funds no measurable effect when
he switches to changes on changes.  Similarly, Harrison and Hanson (1999) find that
high industry tariffs are associated with greater wage inequality when they conduct the
analysis in levels but not in changes.  This suggests that either there is no relationship12
between changes in openness and changes in inequality, or the data are not sufficiently
fine to capture such a relationship.
This is an important observation because in our view changes-on-changes is the
preferred specification.  Globalization is presumably a dynamic concept and a continuing
one.  Regressions of levels-on-levels, however, typically attempt to compare stable
points of equilibrium.  Consider this argument.  Define globalization for present
purposes as trade openness measured by trade policies.  Now imagine two countries, one
of which liberalized trade policy ten years ago while the other has literally just
implemented its trade liberalization.  One would imagine that resource reallocation,
changes in factor prices, and other adjustments would have played out in the ten years
following the reform in the first country, and the distribution of income would have
arrived at a new stationary state.  The relationship between policy and inequality could
therefore be interpreted as an equilibrium.  In the other country, however, trade policy
will have changed but the economy, including inequality, will not have had a chance to
adjust.  If these two countries appear as two observations in a cross-country regression of
levels on levels, it is very difficult to interpret the meaning of any results whether
statistically significant or not.  On the other hand, if the change in policy is related to the
change in inequality after some common period of time in both countries, then the
results, whatever they may be, are easily interpreted.  With this argument in mind, we
focus our empirical work on variables measured in first differences.  That is, we focus on
changes in countries’ policy stances and changes in inequality outcomes.
A second point that emerges clearly from the review is that the impact of
liberalization may differ depending on the initial conditions of the liberalizing country.
However in the empirical work this approach is not always implemented. The implicit
assumption is often that the effects of reforms are the same regardless of the initial level
of policy openness or income. In other words, opening up an entirely closed economy by
one reform point yields the same results as further opening of an already open economy.
We shall try to avoid this type of simplification by controlling for the initial level of
openness and income and, of course, for other initial differences between economies.13
Similarly, reforms which are each represented by one policy variable are seen, for
econometric convenience, to affect outcomes additively. This is a strong simplification:
reforms might often act multiplicatively in that the absence of one type of reform negates
the effects of another. We shall try to allow for this by including interaction terms.
3. Trade and labor reforms, and wage inequality: an accounting model
Model focus and justification
In this section, we present a simple model of wage determination for four types of
labor: skilled, unskilled; and labor employed in the protected and  unprotected sectors.
We also allow for different types of unionization: skill-based or sector-based.  We focus
the model in this way for two theoretical reasons and one empirical reasons.
The first theoretical reason is that the link between policy reforms and wage
inequality is likely to be much stronger than the link between policy reforms and
inequality in total income. What happens to total income and its inequality is mediated by
a number of other factors, including the role of social transfers (pension spending or
family benefits), demographics of the population, family formation and mating, labor
force participation,  and so on. Since wage inequality is relatively immune to such
factors, the link between policy and the distribution of wages should be much stronger
than that between policy and the distribution of total income, and should therefore be
easier to detect empirically.
The second theoretical reason stems from the complexity of the relationship
between policy and the distribution of wages in a country and how best to model it.
Consider some of the puzzles and complexities that have been discussed in the recent
literature.  For example, a number of factors have been adduced to explain rising inter-
occupational inequality (or an increasing skill premium) following trade liberalizations in14
developing countries
5.  This is in direct contradiction to what one might expect based on
the sample version of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, namely that increased demand for
low-skilled products (the alleged comparative advantage of poor countries) should
increase relative wages of unskilled workers.  Moreover, recent developments differ from
those in the 1950’s and 1960’s when trade liberalization in Asian countries did produce
the expected effect (Singh and Dhumale, 2000, p. 25; Arbache, Dickerson and Green
2003, p. 5). Some of the most popular explanations for increasing wage inequality in both
poor and rich countries are the role of skill-biased technological progress (for a review
see Slaughter, 1999; also Slaughter 1997; Singh and Dhumale, 2000), skill-skewed
demand of foreign investors (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997; Kramer 2002; Kanbur 1998),
complementarity between lower cost of capital (which follows upon financial reforms
that accompany trade liberalization) and skilled labor (Greiner and Semmler 2001;
Murphy, Ridell and Romer, 1998; Arbache, Dickerson  and Green 2003). Wage-setting
rules may also be a cause as argued by Warner (2002) who finds that wage inequality is
greater in poor countries because the highly-skilled workers’ (like managers’) wages
respond to global wage-setting conditions, while the low-skilled wages depend on local
conditions. Or, poor countries may also be resource-rich in those tradables that are not
labor- or low-skill intensive like oil and other natural resources (Stewart, 2000, p.16 and
papers quoted there).
6 Some, but not all of these factors, require that the model
distinguish labor by skill or occupation as well as by the location in a protected or
unprotected sector.
                                                
5 This seems to be an almost universal finding. For Chile, see Bayer, Rojas and Vergara (1999) who
speculate (p. 121) that it may be caused either by skill-biased technological progress, or by demand for
resource intensive and skill-intensive sectors. In the Chilean context also, Robbins (1994) finds that relative
demand shifts were crucial for explaining widening wage disparity. For Brazil, see Green, Dickerson and
Arbache (2001, p. 1936),  who argue that the influx of new skill-intensive technologies contributed to the
rising university education premium (and decline in returns to secondary education).
6 This is also one of the conjectures made by Beyer, Rojas and Vergara (1999, p. 121) for explaining
increased skill premium and wage inequalty in Chile. Although natural-resource based exports account for
about ¾ of Chilean exports today as they did in the 1970’s, the new resource-based sectors may be more
heavily skill-dependent than the traditional ones.  Similarly, in the issue of Journal of International
Development dedicated to country studies of globalization, Manda and Sen (2004) find that Kenyan exports
were concentrated on manufacturing products intensive in natural agricultural resources and this stimulated
increasing demand for skilled labor and resulted in rising earnings inequality (see Jenkins, 2004,  in the
same issue).  Behrman, Birdsall and Szekely (2003) which come to the same conclusion: high-technology
exports of Latin Ameerican countries are behind the rising education premium.15
Turning to the empirical reason, inequality measures of total income are not
available annually; we have inequality statistics for most countries only for a few years in
a decade. The Deininger-Squire database, for example, gives on average an inequality
statistic for 1 out of every 5 possible country/year combinations.  In contrast, the two
database on wages that we use – Freeman and Oostendorp (2000) and the University of
Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) database – have annual data for a large number of
countries and years.  This should increase the power of our empirical estimation and tests.
Moreover, these databases provide information on inter-occupational and inter-industry
wage inequality as required by the theoretical approach.
A  model
We begin with the following simple 2x2 model with two sectors (protected and
unprotected) and two types of labor (unskilled and skilled). 
7 We shall make two different
assumptions. First, that collective bargaining is skill-based (all unskilled workers are
unionized, and only unskilled workers are unionized), and second, that collective
bargaining is sector-based
8 so that the benefits of unionization are shared by all workers
in a sector regardless of their skill level.
Skill-based bargaining. Let us start with skill-based unionization and let the basic
unskilled wage be w, and unskilled wages in protected (p) and unprotected sector (u)
respectively,
(1) ) 1 )( 1 ( s t w wup + + = λ
(2) ) 1 ( s w wuu + =
where the first subscript denotes type of labor (skilled=s) and the second subscript the
sector,  t  = tariff rate (protection level),  λ  = share of increased protection that is
“transferred” to wages, and s=percentage by which wage is increased thanks to collective
                                                
7 Since labor does not move between the sectors, one can view it also as four types of labor.
8 The terms “industry” and “sector” are used interchangeably.16
bargaining and other union activities (“syndicalization” or trade union premium). 
9 The
extent to which unionization helps unskilled labor in both sectors is the same.
Skilled wages in the two sectors will be
(3) ) 1 )( 1 ( t p w wsp λ + + =
(4) ) 1 ( p w wsu + =
where all the symbols are the same as before except for p = skilled labor premium. The
premium too is supposed to be the same across the two sectors. Before reform
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Reforms, as the review of empirical literature has shown, are unlikely to pertain to
trade policies alone. They include also direct labor markets changes whether because of
political economy considerations or because policy-makers believe that without changes
in labor markets trade reforms cannot bear fruit. Reforms involve both a decrease in t and
thus in wages in the protected sector; 
11 then a decrease in s brought about by
“flexibilization” of labor markets and  reduced power of trade unions.
12 Both imply an
                                                
9 For the recent assessment of the union premium in a developed economy context, see Card (1996).
10 We assume that there are only four workers (or differently, the same shares of skilled and unskilled labor
in both sectors). In a more complicated model below this assumption will be relaxed by allowing for the
difference in skill intensity between protected and unprotected sectors.
11 Obviously, the adjustment to the reduction in protection may be through labor-shedding rather than wage
cuts. The latter (at least partly and at times fully) seems however to be a common mechanism as argued by
Goldberg and Pavcik (2004, p. 22). This is consistent with a noted absence of labor mobility in developing
countries following trade liberalization.
12 To give a few examples. In 1990 in Colombia, tariff cuts were accompanied by significant reduction of
labor rights (elimination of obligatory rehiring of dismissed employees with more than ten years of service
and of the severance payment system; see World Bank, 1992). In Nicaragua the 1995-96 tariff
liberalization went hand-in-hand with large dismantelment of state sector and “labor flexibilization” (see
World Bank, 1997).  In Peru, similarly, the mid-1990’s liberalization of trade occurred together with further
labor flexibilization (reduction of severence payments; lengthening of the job probation; extension  of17
erosion of wage rents whether they were accrued through protection or unionization. 
13
Greater opening to foreign investments and trade should result in dp>0 for rich countries
and, according to theory (although not always empirical evidence), in dp<0 for poor
countries. In any case, we can posit that the increase in the demand for skilled labor is an
increasing function of country’s income level y (in accordance with Heckscher-Ohlin),
and is also increasing in the extent of trade reform (approximated by dt). The rationale for
this second effect is that greater the reform, greater the opportunity for the comparative
advantage, and in our case, demand for skilled labor to manifest itself. Notice that the
distinction between the “pure” skill premium (p) and the observed skill premium (π)
allows us to let the first behave as the theory would imply while the second, the observed
premium, captures also the effects of union bargaining and sectoral protection. In other
words, even if the “pure” premium follows the theory, what we observe may look quite
different. The change in the observed premium will then be
(7)  ) ) , ( (
1
1
ds dt y dp
s
d π π −
+
=
and the change in inter-sectoral wage differential
(8) 0 < = ∆ dt d λ
We would therefore expect that the observed premium will go up because of the
dismantlement of pro-unskilled labor regulations (ds<0) but the role of increased demand
for skilled labor is ambiguous. In higher-income countries, dp(y)>0 as trade is opened up,
but in low income countries, dp may be negative, that is the skill premium may decline if
there is an increase in demand for unskilled labor (relative to skilled).
 14 Unless this effect
is very strong (which, based on the empirical evidence, is unlikely), we would still expect
dπ>0 in both poor and rich countries.  Wage inequality within each sector and the
observed wage inequality between various skills would go up. At the same time, inter-
                                                                                                                                                
temporary labor contracts for young workers and increase in the maximum proportion of workers allowed
under temporary contracts; see World Bank, 1996 and 1992a and IMF, 1998).
13 Ravenga (1997), for example, finds erosion of union rents to explain the fall of manufacturing real wages
in Mexico after trade liberalization.
14 The change in the premium is not a policy change but depends on what is country’s comparative
advantage and how increased openness (or its reverse) affect it.18
industry wage differences will be reduced as the protected sector loses its advantage. 
15
Thus, within this simple model of pro-openness reform we expect a widening of skill
differences and narrowing of inter-sectoral wage differences. In other words, even if
Heckscher-Ohlin hypothesis holds for the poor countries, that is if dp<0, labor market
reforms would tend to produce ds<0, and the observed change in the premium dπ may
still be positive.
Industry-based bargaining. We have so far assumed that unionization is skill-
based, that is that the gain from unionization is shared by unskilled workers across all
sectors. But a different type of unionization can be horizontal, that is unionization
premium is enjoyed by all workers in an  industry whether they are skilled or unskilled.
This is what industry-level collective bargaining is about. In that case our model changes
as s becomes a premium captured by a whole industry. We shall assume that the union
premium is captured by the protected sector. And indeed protected sectors like steel or
textiles in rich countries are specific because they are both protected from foreign
competition and there is across-sector unionization. Openness combined with labor
reforms will therefore affect them particularly since workers there would lose on two
accounts: both trade protection and unionization rents would dissipate.
Wage rates in that case become
) 1 )( 1 ( s t w wup + + = λ
w wuu =
) 1 )( 1 )( 1 ( s t p w wsp + + + = λ
) 1 ( p w wsu + =
and the observed skill premium will be
  p + =1 π
                                                
15 Since labor composition in the two sectors is the same, and bargaining is skil-based, the only source of
wage differences between the two sectors is protection. As protection is reduced, ∆ must go down.19
The change in the premium is
(9) ) , ( dt y dp d = π
If Heckscher-Ohlin is right, dp<0 in poor countries, and since labor reforms do
not affect the observed premium, we must also have dπ<0. The opposite holds for the rich
countries (dπ>0). Note that the change in the observed premium will not depend on what
happens to labor market conditions (that is, on labor market reforms) since these reforms
have industry-wide effects and thus affect both skilled and unskilled workers equally. In
other words, a change in s does not affect dπ.
The inter-industry wage differential will be
(10) ) 1 )( 1 ( s t
U
P
+ + = = ∆ λ
with the change
(11) 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( < + + + = ∆ ds t dt s d λ λ
Inter-industry wage differences will be reduced very strongly  if protection from
external competition is associated with strong unionization (both dt<0 and ds<0).
Liberalization erodes both of these advantages (enjoyed by assumption by the same
sector).
To sum up. In a model with the same skill composition across sectors, if
bargaining is skill-based, the skill premium would most likely go up in both poor and rich
countries. If  bargaining is industry-wide, then the skill premium will rise in income
level. As for inter-industry wage differences, they will go down regardless of the type of
bargaining and income level of the country. The decrease however will be greater if
protection from external competition goes together with strong unionization. Since these20
two elements are likely to be found together more often in rich countries, inter-industry
wage differences will be reduced more there.
16
Introducing different skill-intensities
So far we have assumed that the skill intensity of the two industries is the same:
each had the same share of skilled and unskilled workers. This is clearly an unrealistic
although helpful assumption. By removing it, we may affect the conclusions regarding
the effects on inter-industry inequality. 
17
We shall consider first the case of skill-level bargaining. The ratio between the
average wages will be
=
+ ) − + +
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where σ1=low-skill labor intensity in the protected sector, and σ2=low-skill labor intensity
in the unprotected sector.
Note that if the shares are the same, the second term in (12) becomes unity. In
accordance with empirical studies reviewed above (Richardson 2000, Harrison and
Hanson 1999; Currie and Harrison 1997; and also Winters, McCulloch and McKay 2004,
p. 100) we assume that prior to trade reforms protection is biased toward the low-skilled
sector in both poor and rich countries. Consider now the polar case where σ1=1 and
                                                
16 Since labor compositions are the same across sectors, the sources of inter-industry wage differences are
either (or both) tariffs or unionization premium. If bargaining is skill-based, then liberalization will erode
the unionization premium, and ∆ must go down. If bargaining is industry-based, then liberalization will
erode protection rents and unionization premium, and ∆ must again go down. The only other possibility—
which we explicitly exclude here—is a combination of protection for one sector and collective bargaining
for the other. In that case, change in ∆ would be ambiguous.
17 Inter-occupational inequality will not be affected by different sectorial skill intensity. It is simply the
ratio between ws and wu and that does not depend on what is the percentage of skilled and unskilled
workers in different sectors.21
σ2=0, viz. protected sector is entirely low skilled while unprotected sector is entirely
high-skilled. In addition, since protected sector is high-skill intensive, it is logical that its
average wage is greater, and hence that U/P ratio represents now an indicator of
inequality. For this to hold  the effect of higher skill intensity must overwhelm the effect
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where we take into account as before that dt<0, ds<0 and dp>0 (for the rich country) and
dp<0 (for the poor country). Expression (13) will be definitely positive for the rich
country. This can be relatively simply explained. Consider a rich country like the
European Union or the United States that protects its low-skill intensive industries (say,
textiles or steel). The tariffs “artificially” raise the average wage of the protected sector.
In addition, that sector, being predominantly low-skilled, is more unionized and enjoys a
“union rent” as well. The wage differential  between it and the unprotected sector will be
small. In other words, steel workers’ wages compared to those in unprotected sectors
will be high. Trade liberalization by destroying the premium enjoyed by the protected
sector and by reducing the “union rent”, will lower the relative wage of steel workers and
the wage gap between the two sectors will increase.
18 Moreover, the pure skill
premium—which favors skilled workers in rich countries—will also move against the
protected sector. Thus, liberalization will hurt the protected sector on all three accounts.
                                                
18 Note however that if the pre-reform average wage of the protected sector is less than of the unprotected
sector, then the opposite follows. In other words, in our model the P/U ratio plays the role of an inequality
measure which it can  only so long as P>U.22
For the poor country, expression (13) cannot be signed unambiguously, because
the declining premium will work in the opposite direction from  t and s. While the latter
two will, as in the rich country, negatively affect the wage in the (low-skilled) protected
sector, a decline in the premium may on the other hand fully or partially offset this loss.


















which in the polar case of σ1=1 and σ2=0 becomes
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We deal with the same situation as before. All three relevant factors (dt, ds and
dp) will contribute to make expression (14) positive for rich countries, while dp>0 will
provide an offsetting element in the case of a poor country.
Summary
It is now time to summarize the key implications of our model. Consider first the
change in the observed skill premium (π). It does not depend on skill composition across
sectors, so our earlier conclusions derived for the case of equal skill composition across
sectors will hold. There we found that with skill-based bargaining, dπ is likely to be
positive for both poor and rich countries; with industry-wide bargaining, we can expect
the skill premium to rise (in response to liberalization) as country’s income increases.23
Let us move now to the change in inter-industry inequality (∆). There skill
composition between sectors does matter and we shall therefore look at these conclusions
only. There we found that d∆ will be unambiguously positive for rich countries while the
sign for the poor countries depended on the relative strength of the skill premium versus
the two rents effects.
While these conclusions are relatively straightforward, they have been obtained at
the cost of several strong assumptions that need to be re-listed explicitly. They are, first,
that, after liberalization, the skill premium (p) increases with average income of the
country. This derives from the simplest formulation of the theory of comparative
advantage. Notice however that we introduce a distinction between a “pure” skill
premium p, and the observed skill  premium π which allows us to take a more nuanced
view. Second, we assume that the unionization rent is captured by the same sector that is
being protected. This is based on the empirical observations from the rich countries and a
political economy view which holds that a sector which is strong enough to “exact”
protection will be strong enough to bargain domestically as well. Moreover, ability to
organize in order to bargain domestically may be the prerequisite to be strong enough to
bargain for protection from foreign competition as well. In that case, the two rents have
to go together. Third, we have, following a recent number of empirical studies, assumed
that low-skilled sector is protected not only in rich countries but also in poor countries.
Combining assumptions 2 and 3, it can be quickly seen that low-skill intensity, protection
from external competition and ability to bargain domestically will go together in both
poor and rich countries. Obviously, in further work some of these assumptions could be
relaxed.
Finally, a fourth, rather technical assumption, is needed to generate our results. It
is that the average wage in the unprotected sector is greater than the protected sector’s
average wage, so that U/P>1  serves as an indicator of inequality. Now, since in both
poor and rich countries the protected sector was assumed to be low-skilled, that
assumption seems reasonable.24
The changes in inter-industry differences following trade liberalization are
summarized as in Table 1.










Poor country dπ not clear dπ<0 Low-skilled workers gain from
comparative advantage but lose
from anti-labor policies




Poor and rich country d∆ likely
positive
d∆>0 P sector (low-skilled) loses
protection; it also loses  from anti-
labor policies and from increased p
in rich country. In poor country,
lower p offsets the other two
elements.
Can we observe skill premium increasing in both countries? For rich countries,
the answer is easy: whether bargaining is skill- or sector-based, skill premium should go
up as trade is liberalized. But for a poor country, observed skill premium will go up only
if bargaining is skill-based and the effect of dismantling pro-labor regulations
overwhelms the “pure” trade effect that is in principle favorable to unskilled labor. 
19
                                                
19 A further modification of this static model—moving it toward a general equilibrium type of models—
could include the effects of wage changes brought about by reform on labor demand and supply. These are
longer-term effects and we do not take them into account here. For example, after the reform in a rich
country, there should be an increased demand for skilled workers in the unprotected sector. This should
bring about an increase in their numbers, and the U sector will become (even) more skill-intensive
compared to the P sector. The effect on the measured ∆ will be to reduce it even further as the average
wage in unprotected sector catches up with the average wage in protected sector. (As mentioned before, we
assume that in the short-run at least,  there is no “overturn” of this relationship, so that P/U ratio does not
become less than 1. However, in the medium term as U sector becomes more skill-intensive and P sector
loses its skilled workers, this could be the  case. )25
4. Data description
Inequality measures
The first of the two large databases we use to derive inequality measures is that of
Occupational Wages around the World (OWW). As mentioned before, the data cover the
period from 1983 to 1999 and more than 150 countries. The coverage in all its
dimensions, however, is problematic and fragmentary. Although there are 156 countries
in total, each country does not provide data (occupational wages) for every year. The
yearly country coverage varies between 48 and 76.  Occupations included also vary from
country to country. Moreover for a given country even when it does provide the annual
data, the occupational coverage is not necessarily uniform for each year. 
20
Furthermore, it should be noticed that each observation is an observation on
“habitual” country-wide wages for a given occupation. Thus some averaging is already
built into the data. That however need not be a problem since, for example, the
differences in earnings by skill levels are also based on averaging. There is however a
difference in that the latter are obtained through a statistical analysis that covers a well
defined spectrum of wage earners (labor force survey) and controls for other relevant
factors (gender, experience), while the ILO data represent a mish-mash of average
“habitual” wages for different underlying populations: some countries—for some years—
report monthly wage rates, other report collectively bargained wages, yet others report
hourly wages. At times men and women are combined, and at times only wages for men
are reported. Freeman and Oostendorp overcome the problems of data comparability by
“calibration” which is essentially a process of finding the adjustment coefficients (based
on a regression analysis) for the data given in a “non-standard” form, where the standard
form is defined as the most common form being used in the dataset, viz. monthly wages
for male workers.
21
                                                
20 For example, the US gives the data on 11 occupations in 1983 and 150 occupations in 1999.
21 They do several such calibration and show (in an  Annex) that the results (inequality statistics) do not
depend on a particular calibration. For our calculations, we have used their suggested base-wage calibration
denoted x1wu in the oww.dta database.26
The great advantage of the database (which incidentally also makes the
calibration possible) is its size: in the Freedman-Oostendorp’s “summary” (compendium)
of the ILO sources,
22 there are more than 72,000 observations of  average occupational
wages. For each of the three indexes  of inter-occupational wage inequality which we
calculate (Gini coefficient, standard deviation and absolute mean deviation from the
median), inequality indexes are calculated only for the country/years that contain more
than 15 occupational wages (of the “calibrated” type). After this “filter” and a few others
(dropping data for a number of small island economies and dependencies), we are left
with 680 observations (country/years) covering the 1983-99 period and 118 countries.
The average Gini is about 23.8, the median 21.7, with the standard deviation of about 10.
A summary of the data is given in Annex 1 (Table 1). These inequality statistics can be,
according to Freeman and Oostendorp, regarded as both indicators of occupational wage
inequality and skill premium.
23
Figure 1 shows the distribution of annual changes in the calculated Gini
coefficients (dginioww) over the 1984-1999 period. As we observe, the distribution is
close to being symmetrical and normal, with the mean which is slightly positive (0.17
Gini point) and a zero median.
                                                
22 The Freeman-Oostendorp database is indeed a “summary” of ILO data since the data on occupational
wages have been collected by the ILO since 1924 while Freeman-Oostendorp data begin with 1983.
23 Implicitly, the greater the dispersion of inter-occupational wages, the greater the return to skills.27
Figure 1. Distribution of  changes in occupational wage inequality (dginioww)
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Note: There are 532 dginioww observations. Changes are expressed in Gini points.
The second large database of inter-industrial wage differences is created by James
Galbraith and associates and is known as the University of Texas Inequality Project
(UTIP) database (see Galbraith and Kum, 2003).The original data come from UNIDO
statistics. The UNIDO statistics provide average manufacturing pay by industry. The
number of industries (which provide their mean wages) varies between countries and
years.  On average, there are 24 industries per country/year (with the standard deviation
of about 7). From these average industrial wages for a given country/year, Galbraith and
his associates calculate Theil index of inequality (variable theil). The UTIP  database
covers on average about 90 countries annually over the period 1975-99.
24  In total, we use
                                                
24 The data are available at http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/. More recently, the database has expanded to the
years prior to 1975. As of January 2004, UTIP data base has almost 3200 country/year Theils, and covers
more than 150 countries.28
1651 Theil indexes from 141 countries (see Annex 1 Table 2 for details). The average
Theil is 5.5, the median 3.8 and the standard deviation 6.4. In about ten percent of
observations inter-sectoral wage differences are minimal with Theils less than 1. Many of
these cases include developed countries (Nordic countries, the Netherlands) but also
Algeria, Cuba, Iran, and until the mid-1980s China.
25
Table 2 shows simple correlations between different inequality measures from the
two databases. We have three inequality statistics from the OWW database (Gini
coefficient, standard deviation and absolute mean deviation from the median) and only
one from UTIP (Theil coefficient). Different inequality statistics from the OWW database
are obviously strongly correlated (see the shaded cells). The correlation between Theil
index from UTIP and Gini from the inter-occupation inequality is much less—around 0.4
(see also Figure 2). Still it shows that higher skill premium is associated with greater
inter-sectoral inequality.   The correlation between the changes in the two measures
(which we shall be using in our regressions) is virtually zero however.
                                                
25 It will be noticed that we do not use Gini coefficient here (although we would have linked, for a more
direct comparison with OWW dataset to do so). The reason is that UTIP  database does not provide
individual mean industrial wages which would allow us to calculate different inequality measures. The
authors only provide the “finished” statistic, that is the Theil index, and not the underlying data. This is not
the case with the OWW database where individual occupational wages by country/year are available and
one can thus calculate various inequality indexes.29
Table 2. Simple correlations between various inequality measures
and inequality concepts
Note: Number of observations given between brackets. Each country/year represents one data
point, that is for each country/year, there is one inequality statistic. The level of significance (null
hypothesis: correlation = 0): ** = less than 1%, * = less than 5%. Shaded are cells with correlation
coefficients calculated between various inequality measures from the same database.
Figure 2. Inter-occupational (Gini) and inter-industry (Theil) inequality
Note: Calculated from 513 observations from 79 countries Total number of observations is 723
(from 103 countries)  for inter-occupational inequality and 2160 (from 141 countries) for inter-industry
inequality.
OWW
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Import liberalization and globalization measures
Trade liberalization can also be measured in many different ways.  The primary
choice is between policies – tariff reductions, elimination of non-tariff barriers, etc -- that
are thought to help globalization, and outcomes such as trade volumes that are a
consequence of trade policies.  Both approaches have been used in the literature.  Most
of the studies reviewed here used trade shares as their measure of globalization.
Lundberg and Squire (2003) use the Sachs-Warner Index which, although linked to
policies, has been criticized on the grounds that it captures more that trade policy.
Edwards (1997) uses a variety of policy measures: average tariff; average QR
(quantitative restrictions) coverage; and average black-market premium.  Savvides
(1998) uses a specially created measure of protection covering both tariff and non-tariff
barriers compiled from UNCTAD data at the four-digit level of the Customs
Cooperation Council Nomenclature.  The measure is only available, however, for 1988.
Finally, those studying wage-inequality within a country are often able to make use of
industry-specific tariff rates and quotas.
All of the various ways of specifying variables representing trade liberalization
are useful and answer interesting questions.  If trade volumes are chosen then the study
says something about the impact of trade volumes on inequality.  And for some purposes
that may be an interesting question.  But, in our view, it does not say much about the
impact of policy on inequality, primarily because trade volumes are not determined
exclusively by policy.  A wide range of factors will influence a country’s trade volume:
country’s geography, technology, demand conditions in importing countries,
competitors’ supply conditions, weather, and so on.  Even attempts to control for these
other factors will inevitably leave a residual that captures more than trade policies.  We
suspect that widespread reliance on trade volumes in the empirical literature reflects the
relative ease of obtaining data compared with the difficulty of achieving the same for
trade policies.  Since we are interested primarily in how pro-openness reforms affect
inequality, we prefer to focus on policies and thus place ourselves squarely in the policy-
maker’s corner. We attempt to answer the question that many policy-makers naturally31
formulate when they envisage trade reforms: “What will be the effect of liberalization
reforms such as tariff reduction on wage differences between various occupations and
industries?”
For import liberalization, we use the World Bank measure of unweighted average
tariff (variable tarf) rate which covers the period from 1980 to 2000, includes 144
countries, and provides 1255 observations (county/years) in total. The list of countries
and number of country/years are shown in Annex 1 (Table 3). Over this period, the
average tariff rate (calculated across the available countries) has been reduced from 28
percent to about 10 percent. Figure 3 how the distribution of average tariff rates by
countries has shifted leftward with the median, mean, and the standard deviation all
significantly less today than in the early and mid-1980’s.
Figure 3. Distribution of countries’ average tariff rates in the periods
1980-88 and 1995-2000
Note: average tariff rate for a country over a period (1980-88 or 1995-2000) represents
one observation. Number of countries is 106 for the first and 132 for the second period.
The reduction has affected both rich and poor countries. The average tariff rate in
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before 1988 after 199532
prices) was reduced from 33 percent to 13 percent; for the rich countries, the reduction
was from 16 to 7 percent. The pattern of reduction for both poor and rich countries has
been very similar to the one shown in Figure 3: not only are average tariff rates less in
2000 than some twenty years ago, but the differences between the countries is much
smaller too (in other words, the distribution of average tariff rates across countries is
much more compressed now than in 1980).
To account for the possibility mentioned above that individual countries are
“globalized” not directly through their own policies but through the effect that policies of
their trading partners have on themselves, we create a special globalization variable.  It is
calculated as follows. For each country, we take its  three largest importers and calculate
their import shares (for the United States, for example, they would be Canada, China
and Mexico). These import shares are then multiplied with a variable denoting presence
or absence of trade reform in the three countries.
26 The result gives an import-weighted
indicator of presence of trade reforms in country’s most important trading partners.
Presumably, if a country’s key trading partners are engaged in reforms, this puts
pressure on the country in question to reform as well.
One problem when trying to link tariff liberalization reforms to domestic
outcomes such as wage distribution is that they are seldom undertaken in isolation. Most
frequently, pro-openness trade reforms are accompanied by other “globalization” policies
that may well affect labor market outcomes: for example, easier direct or portfolio
investment by foreign residents or more liberal regulation of international labor flows.
And just as frequently trade reforms are accompanied by domestic reforms that impact
directly on labor markets: “flexibilization” of the labor market, changes in the minimum
                                                
26 This is a three-way variable: there could be a pro-openness reform, anti-openness reform, or no change.
The calculation is based on Free the World  (FTW) measure of trade taxes: if they decrease sufficiently, a
country is deemed a reformed over the entire five-year period (FTW data are available at five-year itervals).
“Sufficiently” is defined as reduction in trade taxes/trade ratio by more than ½ of the world standard
deviation in that variable. In other words, if world’s standard deviation of trade taxes/trade variable is 5
percent, than if country’s trade taxes/trade ratio goes down by 5 percentage points, it is deemed a pro-
openness reformer. The opposite is the case for anti-openness reforms. Free the World data are available at
www.freetheworld.com. The report is issued by the Fraser Institute, Vancouver (see
http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/shared/readmore.asp?sNav=nr&id=537).33
wage legislation, more (or less) liberal severance pay, reform in the pension regimes etc.
These accompanying domestic reforms often concern labor—whether they are “anti” or
“pro” labor. Sometimes “anti” labor legislation accompanies openness reforms because it
is felt that liberalization in the foreign arena can be emptied of content (or cannot
produced the desired results) if there is no improvement in the domestic legislation, i.e. if
the latter is deemed too restrictive.  Mexico provides one such example (Robertson, 2000
and Hanson and Harrison, 1999). Alternatively, labor policies can, for a segment of labor
force at least, become more generous if that is the short-term cost the government needs
to pay in order to convince trade unions not to wreck the reforms.  In that case, more
generous severance pay, low interest loans to start own businesses, early retirement
schemes can  all be used to reduce the resistance to reforms and to “buy off” potential
losers. In addition to labor reforms, there may be also “accompanying” financial reforms:
liberalization of interest rates, increased competition in the banking sector etc. All of this
complicates any attempt to isolate the impact of trade reform on wage inequality. We
shall therefore try to control for some of these other policies (labor markets, social
transfers).
To measure labor market conditions, we use Labor Market Data Base constructed
by Martin Rama and Rachel Artecona (see Rama and Artecona, 2002). 
27 Their database
has, at five-year intervals (year 1975, 1980 etc.) a number of labor-related measures such
as social security contributions (in percentage of gross salary), unemployment rate,
replacement rate in case of  unemployment  etc. For our purposes, that is bearing in mind
the model described above, two variables are of  particular  interest: share of labor force
covered  by collective agreements, and share of the unionized labor force. They do not
allow us to distinguish between the type of unionization (skill- or industry-based) which
we considered in our model, but they do allow us to proxy the power of trade unions and
organized labor.
                                                
27 The data have been kindly supplied by Martin Rama.34
5.  Level of protection and occupational wage inequality
We look  first at the level relationship between occupational wage inequality and
mean tariff rate.  Figure 4 shows that occupational wage inequality (or returns to
education) tend to decrease with average income level of the country (panel a). This is of
course what we  expect since rich countries have greater proportion of skilled labor.
Likewise average tariff rate tends to be lower in richer countries (see panel b). Finally,
returns to education increase in level of protection (panel c). This last point would seem
to imply that protection is calibrated in such a way as to boost incomes of more skilled
workers.
28 However, this relationship may be only apparent and due to the fact that that
poorer countries tend to have, as we have just seen, higher average tariff rate. In effect,
once we control for the difference in the returns to education that is due to income levels,
the correlation between returns to education and protection vanishes (panel d). It is no
longer statistically significant. We can conclude that in a cross-sectional setting, average
level of protection and occupational wage inequality do not display any obvious
relationship—once we adjust for the fact that poorer countries tend to have both higher
returns to education and higher levels of protection.
                                                
28 Which, by the way, would contradict the general finding of higher protection for less-skilled industries
(see discussion above).35
Figure 4. Occupational wage inequality,
average level of protection and mean income
(a) Occupational wage inequality (b)  Average tariff rate and level
and level of income of income
(c ) Occupational wage inequality and  (d) Occupational wage inequality (controlled for
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unweighted average tariff rate from WB sources
gini of wages, x1wu Fitted values36
But this does not necessarily imply that there is no relationship between the
changes  in mean tariff rate and changes in returns to education.  The correlation
coefficient is –0.10 (see Figure 5) and is significant at the 10 percent level. It suggests
that there may be a weak negative (and uncontrolled for other variables) relationship such
that a decrease in domestic protection (i.e., liberalization) is associated with an increase
in returns to education. 
29
Figure 5. Relationship between change in mean tariff (dtariff) and
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Note: The regression coefficient  remains negative and significant if outliers, that is
observations such that  dtarf<-25 are eliminated.
                                                
29 The two variables are run here and further below contemporaneously. However since the data on mean
tariff rates are often not available for all consecutive years, dtarf variable is defined in such a way as to
include annual changes wherever available, that is,  not only tarf (t) – tarf (t-1) but also tarf(t) – tarf(t-2)
when tarf(t-1) is not available. Thus dtarf is partly lagged (about 20 percent of observations refer to
changes between years t and t-2).37
Figure 6 shows the distribution of changes in occupational Ginis for county/years
for which we have corresponding data  on changes in  protection (that is, Figure 6 shows
the distribution of dginioww for our sample, not for all the observations of dginioww that
we have
30). There is, on average, a tendency for occupational inequality to increase (the
mean Gini change is +0.36, median +0.05) matching the tendency of tariff rates to go
down over the last twenty years (in our sample, the average tariff change is –1.05
percentage points, the median –0.2). Thus there is some prima facie evidence that
decreases in protection and increases in occupational wage inequality may be related.
Figure 6. Distribution of changes in occupation inequality (when both data on
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We look further at this relationship by breaking down changes in returns to
education (dginioww) across average protection changes (Table 3). There is some
evidence that deeper cuts in protection are associated with greater increases in
                                                
30 The shape of the two distributions though is almost exactly the same. The number of cases, however, is
quite different. Our sample contains only 268 observations while  there is a total of 532 observatioons of
changes in occupational inequality.38
occupational inequality. For example, when tariff protection goes down by more than  10
percentage points, occupational Gini increases on average by 1.45 points. When the
reduction in protection is less (between 0 and 5 percentage points), the increase in wage
inequality is also smaller (+0.75 Gini points). This relationship is not very strong and
uniform though. Change in Gini is, on average, positive even when average tariff rate
goes up (by less than 10 percentage points). This in turn suggests that other factors must
be at play too. Furthermore, in a number of cases where there was no change in mean
tariff rate, average (and median) wage inequality tended to go down. On balance, we
conclude that while there is some evidence that import liberalization is associated with
increasing occupational wage inequality this is unlikely to be the only factor that matters.
Table 3. Relationship between occupational wage inequality
and protection (average tariff rate)









Greater than –10 points (in
absolute amounts)
+1.45 4.06 10
Between –5 and –10 points +1.77 5.65 11
Between 0 and –5 points +0.75 3.55 137
Zero -0.79 4.50 70
Between 0 and + 5 points +0.43 3.91 34
Between +5 and +10 points +0.68 1.15 3
Greater than +10 points -0.73 3.78 2
Total +0.36 4.00 268
We next split the sample into rich and poor countries (Table 4). We take $PPP
9,000 (at 1995 prices) as the cut-off point. This means that in 1980 about three-quarters
of all countries in the world are regarded as poor (the proportion is about 70 percent in39
2000.) Since the data for the rich countries are, on average, more frequently available
than for the poor, the cut-off off point neatly splits our sample into about two halves.
Table 4. Relationship between inter-occupational wage inequality
and level of protection (average tariff rate) in poor and rich countries



























Decrease +1.31 4.63 77 +0.44 2.56 82
No change -2.71 6.64 18 -0.13 3.30 52
Increase +0.29 4.21 30 +0.71 1.01 9
Total +0.49 5.02 125 +0.25 2.80 143
Note: poor countries are defined as those with GDP per capita less than $9000 at international
1995 prices. Rich, those above that threshold.
The table illustrates that the same regularity applies to both poor and rich
countries: decreases in protection are associated with higher wage inequality, but so are
(although the magnitudes are substantially lower) increases in protection. It is mostly
when there is no change in mean tariff rate that we find shrinking occupational wage
distribution.  In effect, out of 122 cases when occupational inequality goes down, about
one third (39) involve situations with no change in mean tariff rate. Poor countries
display in all cases (decrease, no change, or increase in protection) greater variability in
outcomes. This is illustrated in Figure 7 where we look at changes in occupational Gini
when protection is reduced. The strongly spiked density function for the rich countries
(dashed line) shows that reduced protection is accompanied by relatively small and  very
similar changes in rich countries’ Ginis; in contrast, in poor countries, Gini changes
(solid line) are much more spread out. The hypothesis of equality  of the two distributions
is soundly rejected (the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is significant at less than 0.1 percent).40
This suggests that while  average dginioww for poor countries may, in response to
liberalization, increase more than  in rich countries (see Table 4), the variability of
outcomes will also be much greater and thus other variables (and possible measurement
error) may play a more important part  in explaining changes in wage inequality.
Figure 7. Distribution of dginioww in poor and rich countries
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Note: Number of observations: 77 for poor countries, 82 for rich countries. Definition of
poor and rich countries given above. Poor countries shown by the solid line; rich countries by a
dashed line.
In Figure 8 we therefore focus on poor countries. We look at the change in their
occupational wage Gini when tariff protection goes up or down. There are some notable
differences: the “down” (solid) line is both thicker in the range dginioww>0 and has a
much longer right-end tail. Thus, not only is the average Gini change greater when
protection is lowered than when it is increased (as we know from Table 4) but the
distribution of Gini changes looks different.
31 There are many more instances of large
                                                
31 However, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test cannot reject the hypothesis that the two distributions are the
same (it is significant at p level is 0.22).  The equality of means is rejected at the ten percent level.41
increases in occupational wage inequality when protection is reduced than when
protection is raised.
Figure  8. Distribution of changes in inter-occupational Gini in poor countries
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Note: “down” indicates the situation when mean tariff rate is reduced; “up” when mean
tariff rate is increased.  “Down” is denoted by the solid line; “up” by the dashed line.
  We now want to investigate how this simple relationship will hold when
subjected to a more rigorous analysis.  To do this, we draw on equations (7) and (9) and
write the change in inter-occupation (∆Ineq(o)) inequality as
∆inequality(o) = fct (∆average tariff, labor market conditions,  income level)  
or
) , , ( ) ( y s t fct o Ineq ∆ = ∆
When bargaining is industry-based, only the first two factors will matter.
A word about the estimation procedure. One might wish to allow  changes in
average protection level to affect inequality not only contemporaneously but through
several time periods (introducing this as a lagged protection on the right-hand side).42
However, in that case our number of observations—whose low number is already an
obstacle to better estimation—drops precipitously and the quality of results deteriorates.
We thus assume that one or two years (to the extent that dtarf includes also some two-
year lagged observations) are a sufficient period of time for changes in protection to work
their way through wage distribution. Endogeneity is unlikely in levels, and particularly so
in a first-difference formulation as here, since change in inter-occupational inequality is
not likely to have  much to do with change in protection. We therefore do not use
instruments.
32 Furthermore,  the use of first-differences implies that idiosyncratic country
effects are included.
33
Table 5 gives the results of the regressions for inter-occupational wage inequality.
We begin with a very parsimonious formulation where change in inter-occupational
inequality (dginioww) is explained by change in average tariff rate (dtarf) and income.
None of the variables is found significant at the 5 percent level; however dtarf is negative
and significant at 10 percent level. The situation changes when we introduce the
interaction term between the change in average tariff rate and level of  income, and trade
union membership or percentage of workers covered by collective bargaining
agreements.  Now, decrease in protection is strongly pro-inequality, with 1 point decrease
in average tariff rate associated with 5.7  percent annual  increase in inter-occupational
inequality. This amounts to an annual increase of 1.2 Gini points for a country with the
average inter-occupational Gini of  about 24. However, this pro-inequality effect is
reduced the richer the country (because of the positively signed interaction effect, see
regression 3), and even for the very  poor countries is less than it appears at first sight.
Thus, in a very poor country with an income of $PPP 1,000, a one point decrease in the
average tariff rate will be associated with a Gini increase of  only 1 percent.  Around
                                                
32 It is also difficult to find reasonable and workable instruments. We tried initial tariff  level, on the
assumption that reduction in tariffs bears some proportion to their initial levels, but the results were
disappointing.
33 Birdsall, Behrmann and Szakely (2003) have the same formulation as here but present also the first
difference formulation of policy changes, or in other words the difference of differences formulation (with
distributed lags over seven periods on the right-hand side). Their first difference in levels formulation
(Table 2) is the same as our equation (14).43
$PPP 5,000 (using regression 3) the effect reverses and trade liberalization begins to be
associated with a decrease in inter-occupational inequality. For example, at the year 2000
mean value of lnGDP per capita (8.4), the effect of the  interaction term is stronger than
the effect of change in tariff rate alone; in consequence, pro-openness reforms will be
associated with a decline in measured inter-occupational  inequality in richer economies.
These results run counter those obtained from the model where, while the observed
premium could rise in both poor and rich countries, it clearly had to go up more in rich
countries. Here however the effect weakens the richer the country and becomes negative
(reduced premium) at high income levels.  In regression 4, we introduce globalization
variable which captures trade reform among country’s partners. The variable is not
statistically  significant  but leaves the other coefficients unchanged. Finally, note  that
the fact that labor market conditions are not statistically significant supports the
contention made in our model
34 that labor market conditions do not affect the change in
the skill premium while the fact that income is not significant in any formulation is
consistent with industry-based (rather than skill-based) bargaining.
The results seem to provide some weak evidence that reduction in average tariff
rate contributes to inter-occupational wage inequality in poor countries although the
statistical properties of the regressions (most notably R
2) are not strong and the number of
observations that we ultimately have to make the regressions is small (79 vs. more than
500 observations on changes in inter-occupational inequality and more than 1000
observations on changes in average tariff rates). Therefore we have to take these results
with a strong dose of caution.
                                                
34 With industry-wide premium.44
Table 5. Explaining inter-occupational inequality, 1984-1999
(dependent variable: annual change in Gini; percentage points)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆tariff -0.118 -1.490 -5.707 -5.428
(0.097) (0.033) (0.009) (0.015)
Ln (GDP per capita) -0.060 0.448 0.456 0.526
(0.816) (0.236) (0.320) (0.265)
∆tariff*ln (GDP per
capita) 0.168 0.688 0.648
(0.057) (0.008) (0.015)
Trade union members













Constant 0.651 -4.221 -4.132 -4.855
0.780 (0.205) (0.331) (0.270)
R
2 adjusted 0.005 0.02 0.06 0.05
F value (p) 1.6 (0.19) 1.7 (0.15) 2 (0.1) 1.7 (0.14)
Number of
observations
233 176 79 79
Note: Levels of significance given between  brackets.  Coefficients significant at less than 5%
level are shaded.45
5. Level of protection and inter-industrial  wage inequality
In Figure 9 we inspect the relationship between inter-industry wage inequality and
several relevant variables (all in levels).  Panel a shows that with greater percentage of
labor force that  participates in collective bargaining, inter-industrial wage differences are
less. Panel b shows that inter-industry wage differences increase as average tariff rate
goes up. Now, low tariff rates are found—as we have seen before—more frequently in
rich than in poor countries. So are high levels of unionization (collective bargaining).
Thus the two seem to be associated (panel c). This finding implies that some of the
positive relationship between the average tariff rate and inter-industry inequality from
panel b may be due to the presence of high unionization. In other words, the upward
slope detected in panel b may be due not to the existence of a real relationship between
tariff rates and inter-industry inequality but to the fact that countries with low tariffs  also
display high unionization—with the latter driving inter-industry wage inequality down.
When we check for it, however, we find that this is not the case. As panel d shows, once
we control for collective bargaining,  the relationship between inter-industry wage
inequality and average level of tariff rates remains positive—nay, it even becomes
sharper. Protection thus indeed seems to drive inter-industry wage differences up. We do
a further check to make sure that the relationship is not due, in part, to a change in the
sample.
35 This is not the case. When we run the relationship between the average tariff
rate and inter-industry wage differences (as in panel b) across the sample of country/years
in panel d, the results do not change (the graph  not displayed here).  Moreover even after
we control for both collective bargaining and income level,
36 the positive relationship
between average tariff rates and inter-industry wage differences remains (Figure 9, panel
e).
                                                
35 This happens because  we have data on tariff rates and inter-industry inequality for many more countries
than is the case with collective bargaining. Thus, once we control for collective bargaining, the sample
shrinks from 757 observations as in panel b to 286 observations in panel d.
36 Since income level and inter-industry inequality are negatively correlated.46
Figure 9.  Inter-industry wage inequality,
average level of protection and unionism
(a) Inter-industry wage inequality (b)  Average tariff rate and
and  collective bargaining         inter-industry wage inequality
(c ) Collective bargaining and  (d) Inter-industry wage inequality
average tariff rate  (controlled for collective bargaining)
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Figure 9 (continued)
(e) Inter-industry wage inequality   (f) Change in average tariff rate and
(controlled for collective bargaining  change in inter-industry wage inequality
and level of income) and average tariff rate
But the relationship between levels may not necessarily be indicative of the
relationship between changes. And in effect, inspection of Figure 9 (panel f) does show
that there is a mild negative relationship between changes in average tariffs and changes
in the Theil index of inter-industry inequality. In Table 6 we look at whether this
relationship holds for poor and rich countries. We easily notice that for rich countries
decrease in protection is associated with an increase  in inter-industry wage inequality;
and the reverse for the increase in protection. This in turn indicates that the protected
sectors tended to be sectors with lower average wage (that is, less skilled) as we indeed
postulated in the model. An increase in protection, on the contrary, is associated with
lower inter-industry wage differences implying again that higher tariffs  will tend to
protect sectors with lower average wage  (presumably, less  skilled too). The same
pattern, on average, holds for poor countries although there the average changes are much
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is observable  in poor countries as in rich countries (decreased protection associated with
increased inter-industry wage differences) would also tend to support our contention that
in poor countries too low-wage or lower-skill sectors tend to benefit from protection.
Table 6. Relationship between inter-industry wage inequality
and level of protection (average tariff rate) in poor and rich countries


























Decrease +0.02 2.56 219 +0.15 0.85 137
No change +0.13 2.49 44 +0.05 0.60 72
Increase -0.08 2.00 113 -0.32 3.41 23
Total -0.01 2.39 376 +0.07 1.29 232
Note: Poor countries are defined as those with GDP per capita less than $9000 at international
1995 prices. Rich, those above that threshold.
Figure 10  shows the change in inter-industry Theil when protection is reduced. In
rich countries, the effect does not vary that much between the countries and is bunched
around zero with a longer right-end tail (which explains the  positive sign of the average).
For the poor countries, both right- and left-end tail are approximately equally long  and
the distribution is flatter.49
Figure 10. Charge in inter-industry Theil when average protection level goes own
Note: Poor countries are defined as those with GDP per capita less than $9000 at international
1995 prices. Rich, those above that threshold.
From equations (13) and (14), change in inter-industry inequality (∆Ineq(i)) can
be written as
∆inequality(i) = fct (∆average tariff, labor market conditions, change in labor
market conditions, income level) 
where the level of skill premium is subsumed in the income variable, that is the
skills premium moves in the reverse direction from average country income.
Table 7 presents the results for inter-industry wage inequality. The first, very
bare, formulation shows that none of the variables is significant. In the second
formulation where we introduce the same two interaction terms as before (trade reform
and income, and trade reform and union membership), the effect of change in protection
on inter-industry wage inequality becomes significant and negative. In other words,
reduction in protection is associated with greater inter-industry inequality: each

























poor countries rich countries50
inter-industry inequality. As argued before, liberalization by dissipating the rents in the
protected and low-skilled sector will increase the wage difference between the two
sectors.  This effect however is less, or is overturned,  at higher income levels (as the
interaction term between income per capita and average tariff rate has a positive sign).
At the median level of (ln) GDP per capita of the countries included in the sample (9.75),
the interaction effect is greater than the direct effect of reform. We would thus expect to
observe, at the median level of income and above, a decline in observed inter-industry
inequality even if pro-liberalization reforms alone tend to increase inequality between the
industries.  More exactly, the turning point would occur around the world median
income where (in the year 2000) we find countries such as Morocco, Ecuador and
Indonesia. For countries poorer than Morocco and Indonesia we would observe trade
reforms increasing  inter-industry inequality, for richer countries, we would observe a
decrease in inter-industry wage inequality. Similarly to what we found for inter-
occupational  inequality, the effects are stronger and less ambiguous for poor than rich
countries.
Reduction of average tariff rate will tend to contribute to inter-industry inequality
more in countries with higher trade union density (see the interaction variable in
regression 2). This is explained by the co-presence of tariff protection and union rents.
Often, industries that lose from reduced protection may be precisely the ones with high
trade union density; similarly, in countries where trade union density is high trade
liberalization will be accompanied by  rent-erosion, with the result that inter-industry
inequality will rise there even more.
In formulation (3), we add the globalization variable but the results are
unchanged. Finally, in formulation (4), we replace trade union membership by  another
labor market variable, the number of ILO conventions that country is signatory to: this
variable too turns out to be positive and significant. It would thus seem that both greater
number of ILO conventions that country is party to and higher trade union density will, in
conditions of tariff liberalization, contribute to greater inter-industry inequality. Income
level alone has a strong and significant effect on change in inter-industry inequality. This51
accords with the results from the model where we established that the effects of
liberalization on d∆ will tend to be stronger in rich countries (see Table 1).
Table 7. Explaining inter-industry inequality, 1976-1999
(dependent variable: annual change in Theil percentage points)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆tariff 0.001 -1.731 -1.797 -2.207
(0.947) (0) (0) (0)
Social expenditures as % of
GDP 1.891 1.097 0.060 -2.487
(0.08) (0.558) (0.977) (0.21)
Ln (GDP per capita) 0.148 0.205 0.409
(0.288) (0.165) (0.004)
∆tarf*ln (GDP per capita) 0.211 0.219 0.247
(0) (0) (0)
Trade union members as % of






Number of ILO conventions
signed 0.007
(0.006)
∆tariff* number of ILO
conventions signed -0.002
(0.044)
Constant -0.119 -1.224 -1.706 -3.879
(0.296) (0.307) (0.178) (0.002)
F value (p) 1.56 4.98 4.46 5.91
(0.2118) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0)
Number of observations 241 171 167 205
R
2 (adjusted) 0.0047 0.1232 0.1273 0.127
Note: Levels of significance given in brackets. Coefficients significant at less than 5% level are shaded.52
6.  Conclusions
The empirical results provide a weak support for the hypothesis that reduction of
tariffs tends to be associated with an increase inter-occupational wage inequality (i.e.
education premium) and a somewhat stronger support that reduction in tariffs is
associated with an increase of  wage inequality  between industries.  The latter  effect will
be particularly strong in high trade-union density countries. This is  because  tariff
liberalizations tend to go hand-in-hand with anti-labor policies so that sectors that are
reaping both the trade union and protection premium lose on account on both. Average
country income plays an important role though. Through its interaction with change in
average tariffs, it offsets the effects of tariff reduction alone so that at income levels
above the world median (that is, GDP per capita higher than $PPP 4000 in 1995
international prices) the net effect reverses both for inter-occupational and inter-industry
inequality.
These results can be contrasted with the hypotheses drawn from a relatively
simple model of wage formation with four types of labor, workers gaining from
collective bargaining and tariff protection, and less skilled sectors being protected in both
poor and rich countries. Higher increase in occupational inequality following upon tariff
reduction in poor countries is not something that we expected based on the model. In
effect, in this simple model, reduction in tariffs should reduce education premium more
in poor than in rich countries, a result directly opposite to what we find here. Yet the
finding—however weak--reported here  has also been made, in  somewhat different
contexts, by several authors who looked at household measures of inequality and
openness (Barro 2000, Ravallion 2001, p. 1811; Milanovic 2005a). The result also tends
to agree with the popular perception of the effects of reforms in developing countries.
This apparent contradiction between the simple models of trade and wage formation, and
empirical results in a cross-country setting is an issue that is still unresolved. On the other
hand, regarding inter-industry inequality, the results are consistent with the model:  we
indeed expected from the model that inter-industry inequality would go up more in poor
than in rich countries.53
Our results are obtained from the data covering approximately a twenty-year
period from 1980 to 2000. The data come from three large and relatively recent data
bases of occupational inequality (Occupational Wages around the World), inter-industrial
inequality (University of Texas Inequality Project) and tariff rates (World Bank data).
Although  all three databases are rich in terms of the number of observations and do
represent a major improvement in data availability, a user cannot escape the impression
that there is still a non-negligible noise in the data, perhaps less because the data supplied
by different countries and in different periods, are wrong but because the coverage of
sectors and occupations and the definitions of wages are uneven and vary  not only
between countries but within countries as well. Thus the data issues still represent an
important obstacle to our ability to draw stronger conclusions regarding the effect of
import liberalization on wage inequality in a cross-sectional setting.54
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ANNEX 1. Table 1. Summary of data from Occupational Wages around the World
(OWW)
Country
Gini of inter-occupational  wages (variable x1wu from OWW)
Mean Std. Dev. Number of obs.
Algeria 0.1492 0.0305 8
Angola 0.3787 0.1196 3
Argentina 0.3545 0.1718 3
Australia 0.1543 0.0315 14
Austria 0.1852 0.0212 17
Azerbaijan 0.5310 0.0292 4
Bangladesh 0.2757 0.0537 9
Barbados 0.2283 0.0205 12
Belarus 0.1232 0.0058 5
Belgium 0.0900 0.0092 16
Belize 0.3173 0.0226 12
Benin 0.3863 0.0327 5
Bolivia 0.3843 0.0378 11
Botswana 0.2297 0.0032 2
Brazil 0.2348 0.0000 1
Bulgaria 0.1611 0.0000 1
Burkina Faso 0.3305 0.1400 8
Burundi 0.4175 0.0325 8
Cambodia 0.3751 0.1494 7
Cameroon 0.3866 0.0908 7
Canada 0.1341 0.0099 3
Cape Verde 0.2430 0.0001 2
Chad 0.5411 0.0548 4
Chile 0.3496 0.0053 3
China 0.1509 0.0371 10
Colombia 0.3649 0.0626 2
Zair, Congo Dem Rep 0.4401 0.0000 1
Costa Rica 0.1315 0.0856 3
Cote d'Ivoire 0.3648 0.0854 4
Croatia 0.1930 0.0000 1
Cuba 0.1621 0.0121 6
Cyprus 0.2550 0.0143 16
Czech Rep 0.1339 0.0227 7
Denmark 0.1217 0.0199 10
Djibouti 0.3321 0.0000 1
Estonia 0.2191 0.0145 4
Ethiopia 0.3533 0.0000 1
Fiji 0.3099 0.0198 4
Finland 0.1343 0.0167 14
Gabon 0.3768 0.0562 5
Germany 0.2110 0.0101 17
Ghana 0.3607 0.0000 1
Honduras 0.3637 0.0316 9
Hong Kong 0.2078 0.0403 16
Hungary 0.2217 0.0378 6
Iceland 0.0972 0.0115 2
India 0.3247 0.1436 13
Iran,Islamic Rep 0.1434 0.0000 159
Ireland 0.1913 0.0014 2
Italy 0.1498 0.0228 12
Japan 0.1995 0.0107 15
Korea, Rep 0.1979 0.0798 10
Kyrgyz Rep 0.3011 0.0153 4
Latvia 0.2558 0.0175 3
Lithuania 0.2328 0.0000 1
Luxembourg 0.1557 0.0000 1
Madagascar 0.1643 0.0536 2
Malawi 0.4522 0.0501 6
Mali 0.3167 0.0000 1
Mauritius 0.3060 0.0172 16
Mexico 0.0616 0.0602 8
Moldova 0.2055 0.0282 5
Mozambique 0.3055 0.0000 1
Netherlands 0.1164 0.0080 7
New Zealand 0.2060 0.0145 7
Nicaragua 0.3685 0.0263 6
Niger 0.3754 0.0000 1
Nigeria 0.3616 0.0570 6
Norway 0.1049 0.0242 16
Papua New Guinea 0.3164 0.0048 2
Peru 0.3525 0.0574 10
Philippinnes 0.0974 0.0357 9
Poland 0.1731 0.0446 2
Portugal 0.1398 0.0884 13
Puerto Rico 0.2071 0.0447 13
Romania 0.2139 0.0646 12
Russian Fed 0.2968 0.1173 8
Senegal 0.2644 0.0000 1
Seychelles 0.2593 0.0557 6
Sierra Leone 0.3099 0.0325 8
Singapore 0.3086 0.0199 15
Slovak Rep 0.1490 0.0149 5
Slovenia 0.2078 0.0160 4
South Africa 0.0982 0.0000 1
Sri Lanka 0.2299 0.0426 12
Sudan 0.2917 0.1540 6
Suriname 0.2336 0.0160 4
Swaziland 0.2911 0.0398 2
Sweden 0.1250 0.0349 9
Thailand 0.3057 0.0416 5
Togo 0.3372 0.0678 5
Trinidad 0.2502 0.0235 7
Tunisia 0.2143 0.1523 6
Turkey 0.1805 0.0489 4
Uganda 0.4810 0.0000 1
Ukraine 0.3049 0.0247 3
United Kingdom 0.1660 0.0170 14
United States 0.2097 0.0306 14
Uruguay 0.2578 0.0279 7
Venezuela 0.2622 0.0233 6
Yugoslavia 0.1760 0.0233 10
Zambia 0.3263 0.0569 7
Total 0.2370 0.1082 68060
Table 2. Summary of data from University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP)
Country Theil index of inter-industrial  wage d ifferences
Mean Std. Dev. Number of obs. .
Albania 0.0736 0.1213 8
Algeria 0.0144 0.0156 15
Angola 0.3115 0.1041 2
Argentina 0.0512 0.0102 11
Armenia 0.2128 0.1351 5
Australia 0.0110 0.0036 23
Austria 0.0189 0.0065 25
Azerbaijan 0.0385 0.0238 5
Bahamas 0.0987 0.0191 3
Bahrain 0.4035 0.0000 1
Bangladesh 0.0349 0.0196 18
Barbados 0.0584 0.0172 23
Belgium 0.0267 0.0009 18
Belice 0.1059 0.0097 2
Benin 0.0744 0.0141 7
Bolivia 0.0711 0.0317 25
Bosnia and Herze 0.0305 0.0124 2
Botswana 0.0585 0.0153 15
Brazil 0.0776 0.0097 5
Bulgaria 0.0250 0.0300 24
Burkina Faso 0.0328 0.0123 9
Burundi 0.0744 0.0297 13
Cameroon 0.1508 0.0907 20
Canada 0.0199 0.0039 25
Cape Verde 0.0052 0.0038 2
Central African Rep 0.0652 0.0279 17
Chile 0.0657 0.0193 25
China 0.0029 0.0010 7
Colombia 0.0393 0.0055 25
Congo, Rep 0.1144 0.0231 8
Costa Ric 0.0398 0.0188 15
Cote d'Ivoire 0.0737 0.0092 13
Croatia 0.0210 0.0103 11
Cuba 0.0046 0.0009 13
Cyprus 0.0363 0.0086 25
Czech Rep 0.0078 0.0049 9
Denmark 0.0066 0.0010 24
Dominican Rep 0.0792 0.0137 11
Ecuador 0.0495 0.0255 25
Egypt 0.0387 0.0228 25
El Salvador 0.0496 0.0349 17
Equatoria 0.0892 0.0178 2
Etiopía 0.0301 0.0084 9
Fiji 0.0512 0.0311 21
Finland 0.0107 0.0013 25
France 0.0160 0.0015 17
Gabon 0.1191 0.0410 7
Gambia, The 0.0374 0.0112 861
Germany 0.0108 0.0003 18
Ghana 0.1277 0.0363 16
Greece 0.0383 0.0125 25
Guatemala 0.1058 0.0826 21
Haiti 0.0458 0.0084 14
Honduras 0.0712 0.0321 16
Hong Kong 0.0112 0.0065 25
Hungary 0.0188 0.0186 25
Iceland 0.0435 0.0324 22
India 0.0838 0.0100 20
Indonesia 0.0751 0.0205 19
Iran,Islamic Rep 0.0211 0.0205 18
Iraq 0.0244 0.0118 15
Ireland 0.0311 0.0185 24
Israel 0.0579 0.0144 22
Italy 0.0164 0.0049 24
Jamaica 0.1816 0.1185 15
Japan 0.0355 0.0172 25
Jordan 0.0779 0.0226 23
Kenya 0.0748 0.0143 24
Korea, Rep 0.0251 0.0059 25
Kuwait 0.2466 0.1247 23
Kyrgyz Rep 0.0851 0.0236 6
Latvia 0.0087 0.0093 6
Lesotho 0.1055 0.0621 7
Libya 0.0324 0.0373 6
Lithuania 0.0713 0.0522 5
Luxembourg 0.0140 0.0034 20
Macedonia 0.0432 0.0225 10
Madagascar 0.0310 0.0182 14
Malawi 0.1128 0.0499 21
Malaysia 0.0313 0.0073 25
Malta 0.0110 0.0035 22
Mauritani 0.1845 0.0583 2
Mauritius 0.0750 0.0245 25
Mexico 0.0290 0.0099 25
Moldova 0.0318 0.0364 9
Mongolia 0.4423 0.4006 6
Morocco 0.0810 0.0145 24
Mozambique 0.1752 0.1233 7
Namibia 0.0314 0.0000 1
Nepal 0.0681 0.0284 9
Netherlands 0.0094 0.0025 25
New Zealand 0.0213 0.0150 22
Nicaragua 0.0205 0.0059 11
Nigeria 0.0390 0.0186 14
Norway 0.0095 0.0011 24
Oman 0.1121 0.0118 6
Pakistan 0.0544 0.0124 18
Panama 0.0669 0.0222 23
Papua New Guinea 0.0990 0.0309 15
Paraguay 0.0133 0.0000 1
Peru 0.0830 0.0352 12
Philippinnes 0.0655 0.0155 23
Poland 0.0158 0.0201 25
Portugal 0.0320 0.0064 1562
Puerto Rica 0.0818 0.0398 15
Qatar 0.4041 0.0914 8
Romania 0.0103 0.0048 5
Russian Fed 0.0581 0.0090 6
Rwanda 0.0393 0.0092 6
Saudi Arabia 0.1847 0.0000 1
Senegal 0.0433 0.0299 23
Seychelles 0.0075 0.0036 11
Sierra Leone 0.1876 0.1344 2
Singapore 0.0434 0.0130 25
Slovak Rep 0.0163 0.0056 6
Slovenia 0.0165 0.0067 12
Somalia 0.0569 0.0258 6
South Africa 0.0616 0.0071 25
Spain 0.0287 0.0074 25
Sri Lanka 0.0526 0.0130 16
Suriname 0.0570 0.0221 19
Swaziland 0.0993 0.0456 20
Sweden 0.0077 0.0097 25
Syrian Arab Rep 0.0548 0.0566 24
Taiwan, China 0.0155 0.0031 23
Tanzania 0.0630 0.0263 13
Thailand 0.0945 0.0350 13
Togo 0.1050 0.0534 10
Trinidad 0.1579 0.0884 19
Tunisia 0.0896 0.0524 13
Turkey 0.0471 0.0189 24
Uganda 0.1739 0.1034 6
Ukraine 0.0347 0.0261 9
United Kingdom 0.0162 0.0022 25
United States 0.0312 0.0128 25
Uruguay 0.0481 0.0147 23
Venezuela 0.0484 0.0261 22
Yemen, Rep 0.0670 0.0902 12
Yugoslavia 0.0847 0.0290 5
Zambia 0.0772 0.0147 6
Zimbabwe 0.0544 0.0298 24
Total 0.0548 0.0645 216063
Table3. Summary of unweighted average tariff rates from World Bank data
Country Average unweighted tariff rate
Mean Std. Dev. Number of obs.
Albania 17.00 0.00 1
Algeria 25.72 6.73 10
Argentina 18.33 8.05 16
Australia 8.17 3.37 11
Austria 7.05 1.34 11
Bahamas, 31.37 1.37 3
Bahrain 5.20 2.63 6
Bangladesh 52.84 33.40 14
Barbados 16.02 4.11 6
Belarus 12.63 0.35 3
Belgium 7.05 1.34 11
Belize 14.66 4.86 5
Benin 33.75 14.30 11
Bolivia 12.58 4.20 16
Botswana 20.55 13.36 2
Brazil 31.89 16.33 20
Bulgaria 16.08 1.88 5
Burkina Faso 32.39 13.28 7
Burundi 29.80 14.94 4
Cambodia 35.00 0.00 1
Cameroon 21.77 5.83 7
Canada 6.74 2.08 9
Cape Verde 22.05 2.90 2
Central African Rep 21.80 6.81 4
Chad 15.75 0.07 2
Chile 14.75 6.57 16
China 33.48 11.59 12
Colombia 20.83 13.42 16
Zair, Congo Dem Rep 23.66 4.76 8
Congo, Rep 19.72 7.44 5
Costa Rica 12.63 5.12 11
Cote d'Ivoire 24.85 3.54 18
Cuba 14.72 7.39 6
Cyprus 11.60 2.50 9
Czech Rep 6.14 1.03 11
Denmark 7.05 1.34 11
Dominican Rep 12.90 4.39 7
Ecuador 17.08 10.70 12
Egypt, Arab Rep 34.79 8.81 10
El Salvador 11.86 5.83 11
Estonia 0.55 1.25 6
Etiopía 30.30 1.62 5
Fiji 12.40 0.00 1
Finland 7.05 1.34 11
France 7.05 1.34 11
Gabon 20.16 0.77 5
Gambia, The 13.55 0.07 264
Germany 7.05 1.34 11
Ghana 20.59 8.71 16
Greece 7.05 1.34 11
Guatemala 11.80 4.92 9
Guinea 21.14 24.54 7
Guyana 17.44 4.50 5
Haití 16.43 9.79 3
Honduras 8.88 1.01 4
Hong Kong 0.00 0.00 21
Hungary 14.42 4.77 13
Iceland 5.97 2.83 10
India 56.49 25.21 14
Indonesia 20.73 9.12 13
Iran,Islamic Rep 15.43 9.12 3
Ireland 7.05 1.34 11
Israel 7.78 0.74 9
Italy 7.05 1.34 11
Jamaica 16.10 4.47 13
Japan 6.08 0.62 12
Jordan 16.32 3.18 16
Kenya 32.25 10.18 15
Korea, Rep 15.55 5.20 15
Kuwait 3.90 0.29 4
Latvia 5.23 0.67 4
Lebanon 13.13 5.89 4
Lesotho 17.40 0.00 1
Lithuania 4.14 0.38 5
Luxembourg 7.05 1.34 11
Madagascar 6.73 0.69 7
Malawi 19.71 4.69 16
Malaysia 12.59 2.94 13
Mali 15.66 2.50 5
Malta 7.54 0.96 5
Mauritania 22.42 6.38 10
Mauritius 31.02 6.88 13
Mexico 16.28 5.41 18
Mongolia 8.20 0.00 1
Morocco 28.15 8.34 17
Mozambique 15.74 1.25 5
Namibia 24.40 0.00 1
Nepal 17.73 4.27 9
Netherlands 7.05 1.34 11
New Zealand 6.99 3.67 8
Nicaragua 11.02 6.64 10
Niger 18.30 0.00 1
Nigeria 30.14 5.25 16
Norway 4.88 1.22 9
Oman 4.12 1.58 9
Pakistan 60.37 14.50 18
Panama 9.96 1.70 5
Papua New Guinea 17.06 5.43 5
Peru 26.48 13.34 19
Philippinnes 23.96 8.61 21
Poland 12.90 3.37 12
Portugal 7.05 1.34 11
Qatar 3.75 1.37 465
Romania 14.20 4.38 7
Russian Fed 11.24 2.48 5
Rwanda 34.53 5.69 4
Samoa 9.00 0.00 1
Saudi Arabia 9.58 4.36 12
Senegal 13.10 1.78 8
Sierra Leone 29.82 8.31 6
Singapore 0.30 0.16 15
Slovak Rep 7.10 0.91 5
Slovenia 11.00 0.69 3
Somalia 29.67 5.98 3
South Africa 11.86 6.43 13
Spain 7.05 1.34 11
Sri Lanka 24.52 8.09 13
Sudan 35.90 21.05 5
Suriname 24.82 10.15 5
Swaziland 15.10 0.00 1
Sweden 7.05 1.34 11
Switzerland 1.59 2.19 8
Syrian Arab Rep 20.57 13.34 6
Taiwan, China 17.94 9.31 13
Tanzania 25.58 5.03 14
Thailand 30.72 10.83 11
Togo 15.25 2.95 4
Trinidad 18.33 1.06 6
Tunisia 27.55 2.47 16
Turkey 21.26 9.32 12
Uganda 16.87 6.89 7
Ukraine 9.83 0.67 3
United Kingdom 7.05 1.34 11
United States 5.93 0.69 12
Uruguay 21.27 11.95 16
Venezuela 19.59 8.32 15
Vietnam 13.50 2.03 4
Yemen, Rep 20.73 4.94 3
Yugoslavia 11.84 0.09 5
Zambia 20.17 7.85 9
Zimbabwe 16.39 6.23 11
Total 17.65 14.12 1255